Operational Resilience

ECB CROE

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At a Glance
ECB CROE — Cyber Resilience Oversight Expectations for Financial Market Infrastructures
  • Classification
    Category
    Operational Resilience
    Domain
    Operational Resilience
    Framework Family
    Other
  • Regulatory Context
    Type
    Guidance
    Legal Instrument
    Guidance
    Sector
    Financial Sector
    Industry
    Financial Services
  • Region / Publisher
    Region
    Europe
    Region Detail
    Euro area
    Publisher
    European Central Bank (ECB), Eurosystem oversight
  • Versioning
    Version
    Cyber resilience oversight expectations for financial market infrastructures, December 2018
    Effective Date
    December 2018
    Issue Date
    December 2018
  • Adoption
    Adoption Model
    Regulatory Compliance
    Implementation Complexity
    High
  • Official Reference
License Information

License included / downloadable: Yes

The CROE document is published free by the European Central Bank and is included with the platform for reference.

Framework text is licensed by its publisher and is included only where stated above.

Official Resources
ECB Cyber Resilience Oversight Expectations Document
Defines the cyber resilience expectations for financial market infrastructures as published by ECB.
Key takeaways
  • The ECB's Cyber Resilience Oversight Expectations set three levels, evolving, advancing, and innovating, across eight categories for financial market infrastructures.
  • Published December 2018, they operationalize the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance on cyber resilience for Eurosystem overseers.
  • They apply directly to payment systems and TARGET2-Securities; national authorities may use them for other FMIs.
  • The CROE is not a checklist: where an FMI does not meet an expectation it applies a meet-or-explain principle.
  • SmartSuite tracks the expectations for each of the eight chapters with owners, evidence, and a self-assessment for the overseer discussion.

Overview

The Cyber Resilience Oversight Expectations (CROE) are the European Central Bank's detailed expectations for how financial market infrastructures (FMIs) operationalize the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance on cyber resilience, set at three levels (evolving, advancing and innovating) across eight categories. Eurosystem overseers apply them to all payment systems and to TARGET2-Securities (T2S). The ECB published the document in December 2018.

The ECB's Governing Council adopted the CROE, and Eurosystem overseers use it to assess FMIs. It applies directly to payment systems and T2S. For central securities depositories, securities settlement systems and central counterparties, oversight sits mostly with national central banks and authorities, which may choose to use the CROE under their own laws.

FMIs assess themselves against the expectations for their level, build the capabilities (people, processes and technology) the expectations describe, and discuss gaps with their overseer. The CROE says it is not a checklist: where an FMI does not meet an expectation it applies a meet-or-explain principle.

Why does it matter?

Cyber incidents at an FMI can spread to participants, linked FMIs and service providers, and can even defeat backup and replication arrangements that were built for physical outages (section 1.1). The CROE exists so that overseers and FMIs share a clear, graded picture of what good cyber resilience looks like and how to move toward it.

Key benefits include:

  • A clear benchmark for overseers

The CROE gives overseers the expectations they use to assess an FMI and a basis for a meaningful discussion with it (section 1.2).

  • Three levels that show progress

Evolving, advancing and innovating let an FMI measure where it stands and set priorities for improvement (section 1.4.1).

  • Proportionate expectations

Retail payment systems are expected to reach evolving as a minimum, while systemically important payment systems and T2S are expected to reach advancing (section 1.4.2).

  • Flexibility with accountability

An FMI that does not meet an expectation explains how it meets the underlying objective, under the meet-or-explain principle (section 1.4.2).

  • Built on recognized sources

The CROE builds on the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance and the PFMIs, and draws on NIST CSF, ISO/IEC 27002, COBIT 5, ISF and the FFIEC tool (section 1.2).

How does it work?

The CROE has eight chapters in section 2: five risk management categories, which are governance (2.1), identification (2.2), protection (2.3), detection (2.4) and response and recovery (2.5), and three overarching components, which are testing (2.6), situational awareness (2.7) and learning and evolving (2.8). Each chapter starts with a preamble from the Guidance and then lists expectations for each of the three levels.

The levels build on each other. Evolving means essential capabilities are established and sustained and performance is monitored. Advancing adds more advanced tools integrated across business lines to manage cyber risk proactively. Innovating adds enhanced capabilities and proactive collaboration with external stakeholders, which may call for new controls or information-sharing groups.

An FMI is expected to reach its level across all eight categories and then keep improving. Overseers apply professional judgment, taking into account local law, the FMI's size, criticality and business model, and an ongoing dialogue with the FMI (section 1.4.2).

Key Elements

  • Levels of expectation (section 1.4.1)

Evolving, advancing and innovating. Capabilities means the people, processes and technologies an FMI uses to identify, mitigate and manage its cyber risks.

  • Governance (section 2.1)

A cyber resilience strategy and framework approved by the Board, defined roles for the Board and senior management (2.1.2.2), and a senior executive such as a CISO whose role is described in Annex 3.

  • Identification and protection (sections 2.2 and 2.3)

Know your critical functions, assets and interconnections, then protect processes, assets and people.

  • Detection, response and recovery (sections 2.4 and 2.5)

Detect incidents, manage them, protect data integrity, communicate and collaborate, and be ready for forensics, so critical operations resume rapidly, safely and with accurate data.

  • Testing, situational awareness, learning (sections 2.6 to 2.8)

Test the framework with vulnerability assessments, scenario-based testing and penetration tests, gather and share cyber threat intelligence, and learn from events.

  • Applicability by FMI type (section 1.4.2)

Payment systems and T2S follow Eurosystem expectations by criticality, and other authorities decide what level they expect from other types of FMI.

What does it cover?

The CROE is directly aimed at FMIs. The Eurosystem applies it to all payment systems (systemically important, prominently important retail and other retail) and to T2S. Clearing and settlement systems, central securities depositories, central counterparties and trade repositories fall under national authorities, which may adopt it at their discretion. The expectations are without prejudice to all relevant laws and regulations (section 1.3).

What are its objectives?

The CROE helps FMIs reach the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance and gives overseers a consistent way to assess them.

Turn the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance into detailed, level-based expectations.

Give overseers clear expectations for assessing the FMIs they are responsible for.

Provide a basis for a meaningful discussion between FMIs and their overseers.

Encourage continuous improvement rather than a static, compliance-only culture.

Cover governance, identification, protection, detection, response and recovery, testing, situational awareness and learning.

Framework in Context

The CROE sits under the PFMIs adopted by the ECB's Governing Council in 2013 and the 2016 CPMI-IOSCO cyber resilience Guidance. It is a Eurosystem oversight tool, separate from the EU rules on digital operational resilience for financial entities, which are law. Its structure is close to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework functions, which the ECB cites as one of its sources.

Common Framework Mappings

Organizations map ECB CROE to complementary standards and regulations to align cyber resilience, operational continuity, and security controls across financial institutions, regulators, and service providers.

Mapped frameworks include:

CPMI-IOSCO Guidance on Cyber Resilience for Financial Market Infrastructures

Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)

ISO/IEC 22301

ISO/IEC 27001

ISO/IEC 27002

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

NIST SP 800-53

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF)

SMARTSUITE

How SmartSuite Supports ECB CROE

SmartSuite provides the system for managing controls, evidence, mappings, assessments, and reporting.

Use Operational Resilience & Business Continuity and Cyber & IT Risk to track the evolving, advancing and innovating expectations for each of the eight chapters, with owners, evidence and a self-assessment for the overseer discussion.

Expectation Library by Level

Hold the expectations for each chapter and level, with the FMI's target level, owner and evidence (sections 1.4 and 2).

Board and Senior Executive Accountability

Record the board-approved strategy and framework, the senior executive role and the review calendar (sections 2.1.2.1 and 2.1.2.2 and Annex 3).

Critical Function and Asset Register

Link critical functions, information assets, service providers and interconnections to the identification and protection expectations (sections 2.2 and 2.3).

Incident and Recovery Workflow

Run incident management, recovery objectives, data integrity checks, communication and forensic readiness as tracked procedures (section 2.5).

Testing and Threat Intelligence Plan

Schedule vulnerability assessments, scenario-based tests and penetration tests, and log threat intelligence and information sharing (sections 2.6 and 2.7).

Meet-or-Explain Reporting

Record each expectation not met, the explanation of how its objective is still met, and the action plan, for discussion with the overseer (section 1.4.2).

Related frameworks

EU DORA

DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) requires EU financial entities to manage ICT risk, report major incidents, test resilience and control ICT third-party risk, applying from January 17, 2025.

ISO 22301

ISO 22301:2019 specifies requirements for a business continuity management system to protect against, prepare for, respond to and recover from disruptions.

ISO 27001:2022

ISO/IEC 27001:2022 specifies requirements for an information security management system: Clauses 4 to 10, risk treatment, the Statement of Applicability and 93 Annex A controls.

ISO 27002:2022

ISO/IEC 27002:2022 is the reference set of 93 information security controls in four themes, with attributes and implementation guidance, that supports an ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS.

NIST CSF 2.0

NIST CSF 2.0 (CSWP 29, February 26, 2024) is the voluntary cybersecurity framework with six Functions including Govern, 22 Categories, 106 Subcategories, Profiles and Tiers.

NIST 800-53 Rev.5

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 is the NIST catalog of security and privacy controls in 20 families, mandatory for federal systems under OMB A-130 and FISMA; Release 5.2.0 issued August 27, 2025.

SWIFT CSCF

The SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF v2026) sets 32 mandatory and advisory controls that every Swift user attests to each year under the Customer Security Programme.

FAQ

Frequently Asked Questions For ECB CROE (Cyber Resilience Oversight Expectations for Financial Market Infrastructures)

The Cyber Resilience Oversight Expectations are the ECB's detailed expectations for how financial market infrastructures put the CPMI-IOSCO cyber resilience Guidance into practice. They set three levels of expectation and are used by Eurosystem overseers to assess FMIs (sections 1.2 and 1.4).

Evolving means essential capabilities are established and sustained. Advancing adds more advanced, integrated tools that manage cyber risk proactively. Innovating adds enhanced capabilities and proactive collaboration with external stakeholders (section 1.4.1).

All prominently important and other retail payment systems are expected to reach and maintain evolving as a minimum. Systemically important payment systems and T2S are expected to reach and maintain advancing (section 1.4.2). Other authorities decide the level for CSDs, CCPs and trade repositories.

No. The document says it should not be considered a checklist of measures to be strictly complied with. FMIs that do not meet an expectation explain how they meet its underlying objective, under the meet-or-explain principle (section 1.4.2).

Five risk management categories, which are governance, identification, protection, detection, and response and recovery, and three components, which are testing, situational awareness, and learning and evolving (section 1.5 and chapter 2).

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